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Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

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SSO-00 INR-07 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PRS-01 SY-02 SP-02 /053 W
---------- 110295
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3811
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECDEF/ISA
DIA
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORS, PINS, MASS, UK, BA, IR, IZ, JO, KU
JU, QA, SA, TC, EG, LE, PK, SU, YE
SUBJECT: ADVISORY ROLES OF THE UK AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES
IN DEFENSE/SECURITY FIELD IN PERSIAN GULF STATES

REF: STATE 029563

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1. SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL, EMBASSY

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FORWARDS FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY REPLY TO S/IG INSPECTION RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 20 WHICH RECOMMENDED "AN EVALUATION OF JORDAN'S PRESENT AND POTENTIAL EFFORT IN THE GULF." AS REQUESTED, IT INCLUDES (A) SPECIFIC DATA (B) AN ASSESSMENT OF RATIONALE AND (C) SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING POLICY OPTIONS, INCLUDING, AS REQUESTED, EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF THE JORDANIAN "FIRE BRIGADE" AS A QUICK REACTION CAPABILITY. END SUMMARY.

2. DATA: EMBASSY PROVIDES FOLLOWING DATA (SOURCE JORDAN ARMED FORCES) REGARDING JORDANIAN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH GULF STATES IN CY 1974:

A) GULF MIL STUDENT IN JORDAN (1974)

BAHRAIN	83
ABU DHABI	49
OMAN	38
UAE	15
QATAR	51
SAUDI ARABIA	511
KUWAIT	121
N. YEMEN	13
TOTAL	881

B) JAF ADVISORS IN GULF (1974)

BAHRAIN	24
ABU DHABI	272
OMAN	50
DUBAI	16
QATAR	41
N. YEMEN	11
ENG CO. (OMAN)	198
PL ADV (AD, BAH, OMAN, QATAR)	48
TOTAL	660

C) JAA MIL EQUIP TO GULF (CY 1974)

42 SALADINS	N. YEMEN, ABU DHABI, OMAN
31 106 RR	ABU DHABI

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40MG	ABU DHABI
10 81MM MORT	N. YEMEN
60 3" MORT	N. YEMEN
26 25 PDR	ABU DHABI, OMAN
8 3.5" RL	BAHRAIN
150 T AMMO	ABU DHABI, OMAN, N. YEMEN

D) FUNDS RECEIVED FROM GULF FOR MILITARY PURPOSES (CY 1974) $M (SEE NOTE B)

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ABU
APCS (GRANT) 42
RADAR (GRANT) 8
SALADIN PURCHASE (SALE) 5
E) MILITARY AID FROM GULF
(CY 1974 TO PRESENT) $M
SAUDI ARABAI
AIRFIELD (1974) GRANT 12 (SEE NOTE A)
RABAT SUBSIDY (1975) GRANT 51
MILITARY HOUSING (1975) GRANT 10
(SAUDIS HAVE AGREED TO UNDERWRITE US FY 1975 FMS CREDIT UP TO
$30 MILLION)
NOTE (A) - PROMISED IN 1974, TO BE PAID DIRECTLY TO CONTRACTOR
BEGINNING PROBABLY IN 1975
QATAR
BARRACKS (GRANT) 4
IRAN
MIL QTRS (GRANT) 10
22 F-5A/B ACFT (GIFT) 12 (EST VAL)
MILITARY BUSES (GRANT) 2 (EST VAL)
NOTE (B) EXCL: (A) APPROXIMATELY $87M/YR., KUWAITI AND SAUDI,
KHARTOUM BUDGET SUPPORT DENOMINATED IN KUWAIT DINARS AND BY SAUDIS
IN STERLING;
(B) SAUDI $47M (1975) ONE-TIME BUDGET SUBSIDY
GIVEN IN JANUARY 1975.

3. BACKGROUND:
IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT JORDANIAN
GULF RELATIONS DATE FROM LONG BEFORE THE EMER-
GENCE OF RECENT US INTEREST IN THE GULF. FOR IN-
STANCE, JORDANIAN TEACHERS WERE IN OMAN FROM THE
1930S AND KING HUSSEIN'S GRANDFATHER HAD CLOSE RE-
LATIONS WITH THE RULERS THERE. CURRENT RELATIONS
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ARE ALSO CLOSE AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REMAIN SO,
WITH OR WITHOUT US INPUT. SECONDLY, GULF FINAN-
CIAL RESOURCES AND JORDANIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY
RESOURCES, EVEN WITHOUT US ASSISTANCE, ARE ADE-
QUATE FOR MAINTENANCE OF SIZEABLE PROGRAMS. POLICY QUESTIONS
ARE THEREFORE: (A) WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DOES U.S. WANT JORDAN TO DO
IN GULF, RECOGNIZING GOJ IS THERE ALREADY, AND
WHAT POSTURE CAN OR SHOULD US DEVELOP TO SHAPE, CHANGE OR
INFLUENCE JORDANIAN-GULF RELATIONS IN WAYS THAT RESPOND TO
US POLICY OBJECTIVES.

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R. RATIONALE: JORDANIAN AND US OBJECTIVES:
US AND JORDAN HAVE SEVERAL COMMON OBJECTIVES REGARDING
JORDANIAN PRESENCE IN GULF: A) MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY
OF MODERATE, TRADITIONAL REGIMES AGAINST RADICAL THREATS;
B) DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT
FOR JORDAN'S CHRONIC BUDGET DEFICIT (THEREBY REDUCING,
AT LEAST IN US VIEW, US FINANCIAL BURDEN); C) DEVELOPING
PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONDING TO FUTURE POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY
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REQUIREMENTS IN SUPPORT OF STABILITY IN THIS CRITICAL
STRATEGIC AREA--THE JORDANIANS RE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT
THE DISPLACEMENT OF TRADITIONAL RULERS BY RADICAL ARAB INFLUENCES
OR REGIMES; D) DEVELOPING A MARKET FOR US MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TO THE EXTENT WE ARE PREPARED TO SELL IT; AND E) INFLUENCING
ORIENTATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN GULF IN MANNER FRIENDLY TO
JORDAN AND THE US. (JORDAN SEES ITS MILITARY AS NON-POLITICAL
IN IDEOLOGICAL SENSE AS OPPOSED TO EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN OFFICERS
AND NCO'S).
OUR MAJOR RATIONALE FOR US SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN ROLE
HAS BEEN:
A) AS REGIONAL ARAB STATE, JORDAN IS MORE ACCEPTABLE AND IN
SOME WAYS MORE EFFECTIVE,PARTICULARLY IN CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE
CONTEXT, THAN DIRECT US DEFENSE OR SECURITY PRESENCE.
B) GIVEN JORDANIAN DEPENDENCE ON US POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPORT, US CAN EXERT MORE INFLUENCE ON JORDANIAN ACTIONS
REGARDING THE GULF THAN IT CAN ON IRAN OR SAUDI ARABIA;
C) JORDAN WAS ALREADY IN GULF AND THEREFORE READILY
AVAILABLE TO HELP FILL SECURITY GAP FOLLOWING REDUCED
BRITISH ADVISORY ROLE IN AREA;
D) JORDANIANS HAVE A RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE AND WELL-TRAINED
MILITARY FORCE WHICH PREFERS TO USE US EQUIPMENT AND WHICH
IS CAPABLE OF DEMONSTRATING, MAINTAINING AND TRAINING IN
US EQUIPMENT.

5. US POLICY CONSTRAINTS:
US POLICY CON-
STRAINTS SEEM TO US TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
A) WE WISH TO SUPPORT JORDANIAN-GULF RELATIONS RATHER THAN TAKE
THE LEADIN PROMOTING JORDANIAN PROGRAMS. THUS, WE PREFER TO
RESPOND DIRECTLY TO REQUESTS FROM POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS, SUCH
AS IN RECENT CASE OF NORTH YEMEN, RATHER THAN ACTIVELY SOLICIT
JORDANIAN ROLE.
B) WE WISH TO TAKE SAUDI ARABIAN SENSITIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT,
INASMUCH AS SAG IS MAJOR FINANCIAL FACTOR IN JORDAN AND SINCE,
IN VIEW OF SAG'S GREAT WEALTH AND OWN MILITARY SHORTCOMINGS, IT
IS SOMEWHAT SUSPICIOUS OF ANY POTENTIAL RIVAL PRESENCE IN
PENINSULA. INCREASING JORDANIAN COMBAT PRESENCE IN OMAN, AND
A BEEFED UP AIRLIFT CAPABILITY MIGHT WELL FEED SUCH SAUDI
SUSPICIONS.
WE WISH TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION THAT JORDAN IS A
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USG CHOSEN INSTRUMENT IN PENINSULA, CAPABLE OF ACTIONS
CONTRARY TO SAG POLICY OBJECTIVES. SUCH SUSPICIONS CAN
BE MINIMIZED THROUGH CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS WITH SAUDIS.
C) THUS FAR, THE US AND JORDAN HAVE PROCEEDED CAUTIOUSLY,
BUT THERE IS A REAL DANGER JORDAN COULD GET IN OVER ITS
HEAD IN TERMS OF ACTIVE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND THEN MIGHT

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LOOK TO THE US TO BAIL IT OUT.

6. JORDANIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR US SUPPORT:
THESE VARY WITH RESPECT TO THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES IN THE
PENINSULA. IN UAE, BAHRAIN AND QATAR LIMITED ADVISORY ROLE
IS WELL ESTABLISH. (WE ARE LESS CLEAR ON CHARACTERIZATION OF
JORDANIAN
INTEREST IN SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT AND WOULD APPRECIATE
JIDDA'S AND KUWAIT'S VIEWS.) THEY APPEAR TO BE MUCH MORE AD HOC IN
SAUDI ARABIA AND CONSIST OF PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIAN SECURITY AND MILITARY ADVISOR,
EXCLUSIVELY RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS. JORDAN ALSO TRAINS A
SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OS SAUDI AND KUWAITI OFFICERS AND TROOPS IN JORDAN
.
MAIN US INPUT REQUIRED IS LOW-KEY DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND
CONSULTATIONS REGARDING QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAM
AND POSITIVE RESPONSE TO AD HOC REQUESTS REGARDING EQUIPMENT
TRANSFERS AND TRAINING ASSISTANCE. IN OMAN, WHERE JORDAN HAS
COMBAT TROOP PRESENCE (198-MAN ENGINEERING COMPANY NOW PRESENT
AND 500-MAN SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION DUE IN FEB-MARCH),
JORDANIANS WOULD LIKE AND EXPECT SOME US SUPPORT FOR SOLVING
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS. THEY MIGHT ALSO ASK US TO PROVIDE C-130
AIRLFIT, IF IRAN AND SAUDIS CANNOT OR WILL NOT PROVIDE THIS.
IN NORTH YEMEN, WHERE JORDANIAN PROGRAM BEING ESTABLISHED,
GOJ WOULD PROBABLY LIKE SOME US FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE SO AS NOT
TO BE SOLELY DEPENDENT ON SAUDI AID, BUT AT MINIMUM EXPECTS
CLOSE CONSULTATION AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT VIS-A-VIS YAR AND
ALSO VIS-A-VIS POTENTIAL DONORS SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND UAE.

7. ISSUES:
THERE ARE HOWVER SEVERAL DILEMMAS IN US-
JORDANIAN EFFORTS:
A) THE GOJ IS MORE ACTIVIST THAN US IN ITS
APPROACH. KING HUSSEIN HAS PROMOTED MORE AGGRES-
SIVE JORDANIAN ROLES IN BOTH OMAN AND NORTH YEMEN
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THAN HAS US. AS A RESULT, GOJ HAS AT TIMES BEEN
IMPATIENT WITH US CAUTION, PARTICULARLY CONCERN-
ING US FUNDING OF JORDANIAN EFFORT AND OUR IN-
ABILITY OR APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS TO SELL OR OTHER WISE PUR-
CHASE OR REPLACE NEEDED MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
(B) GOJ MORE IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED TO FORWARD
POLICY AGAINST RADICAL ELEMENTS, WHEREAS AT TIMES
US SEEMS TO HAVE GREATER INTEREST IN CONFLICT-
LIMITING OBJECTIVES; E.G. PDRY-NORTH YEMEN CONFLICT

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C) GOJ ALSO IMPATIENT WITH LACK OF FIRMER AND
MORE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO US
SUPPORT FOR JORDAN GULF ROLE. OUR POSTURE HAS
BEEN TO REVIEW US SUPPORT ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES OVER US FUNDING ROLE.
WE BELIEVE GULF STATES SHOULD UNDERWRITE FINAN-
CAIL REQUIREMENTS FOR JORDANIAN ROLE AND IN FACT
CONTRIBUTE TO LESSENING US ASSISTANCE BURDEN IN
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JORDAN. ALTHOUGH GULF ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN GENEROUS
TO JORDAN, JORDANIANS BELIEVE US SHOULD CONTINUE
SOME SPECIFIC FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE DESPITE GULF
FINANCING. WE SEEL LITTLE WE CAN OR NEED TO DO TO
RESPOND TO THIS BASIC PROBME, PARTICULARLY
SINCE US BIDGET AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN OUR VIEW
CONTRIBUTE TO GENERAL JAF MILITARY CAPABILITY.
ONLY SPECIFIC SUGGESTION IS IMPROVEMENT IN
USG PROCEDURES REGARDING JORDANIAN TRANSFER OF USG
ORIGIN EQUIPMENT. SPECIFICALLY, GRANT AID ORIGIN
EQUIPMENT CANNOT BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT FINANCIAL
DISADVANTAGE TO JORDAN, BECAUSE PROCEEDS MUST RE-
VERT TO USG. ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNIZE SOME PROBLEMS
IN CURRENT LEGISLATION, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT JORDAN MIGHT
PURCHASE EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY US ON GRANT PRIOR TO 1970,
FOR 7 PERCENT OF ITS VALUE, BOTH TO RELIVE US OF ACCOUNTABILITY
AND ALSO TO PROVIDE FOR GIFTS TO GULF. ANY PROFITS REALIZED
WOULD STILL PRESUMABLY ACCRUE TO THE US. THUS FAR,
JORDAN HAS SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THIS PROPOSAL.
D) WITH REGARD TO ESTABLISHING CONTINGENCY READINESS
CAPABILITY, US-GOJ INTERESTS GENERALLY COINCIDE IN OPPOSING
RADICAL FORCES IN AREA, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF
EMPHASIS AND AS TO PRIORITIES. DESPITE SOME SUCH UNCERTAINTIES,
THERE ARE PERHAPS SUFFICIENT IDENITIES OF INTEREST TO
MERIT CONTINUING US SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN QUICK REACTION
CAPABILITY IN GULF--PARTICULARLY INASMUCH AS FORCE WILL BE USED
SHORTLY AGAINST RADICAL FORCES IN OMAN.

8. "FIRE BRIGADE":
JORDANIAN CAPABILITY:
JAF'S CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY A SF BRIGADE IN THE
GULF AREA IS LIMITED ONLY BY AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT. JORDAN
HAS 2 C-130S AND 3 C-119S; LATTER WILL BE DISPOSED OF WHEN
2 TO 4 BOEING 707-320 FREIGHTERS ARE ACQUIRED FOR JAF/ALIA.
PERSONNEL OF BRIGADE ARE EQUIPPED AND QUALIFIED FOR A
PARACHUTE DROP OR QUICK DEPLOYMENT BY AIR LANDING IF A FIELD
CAN BE SECURED. ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT COULD BE PROVIDED
BY SA OR IRAN. JORDAN'S ABILITY SUCCESSFULLY TO CARRY OUT THE
MISSION IS CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED BY ALREADY HAVING A LARGE
NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORS IN AREA (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE) PLUS ABOVE
MENTIONED ENGR CO AND SOON A SF BN IN OMAN. FIGHTER AIR-
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CRAFT COULD ACCOMPANY AND SUPPORT A DEPLOYMENT PROVIDING
THEY WERE PERMITTED A REFUELING STOP IN SA.

9. CONCLUSION:
A) WHETHER OR NOT THE USG DECIDES ON MORE DIRECT US

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INVOLVEMENT IN GULF (E.G. MAAG PRESENCE), WE SEE USEFUL
CONTINUING ROLE FOR JORDAN,DUE TO PROPINQUITY, ARABIC
LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AFFINITY AND ADVISORY EFFECTIVENESS.
JORDANIANS COULD IN FACT BE HELPFUL BRIDGE BETWEEN GULF AND
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.
B) SECONDLY, WE BELIVE GOJ WILL REMAIN INVOLVED IN GULF WITH
OR WITHOUT US SUPPORT. LARGE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND BUDGET
SUPPORT PROGRAM PROVIDES GENERAL SUPPORT FOR GOJ WHICH HAS
APPLICATION IN GULF AS WELL AS IN JORDAN. TO THAT EXTENT, USG
CAN FORCEFULLY ARGUE THAT WE ARE PROVIDING SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT
FOR JORDANIAN GULF ROLE AND NEED NOT NECESSARILY BE DEFENSIVE
ABOUT ABSENCE MORE EXPLICIT MATERIAL SUPPORT,PARTICULARLY SINCE
WE ALLOW JAF TO PROGRAM US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRETTY MUCH AS IT
WISHES TO ESTABLISH CAPABILITY FOR GULF ROLE. THIS APPLIES TO
SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL FORCES AS A QUICK REACTION BRIGADE. AS
MENTIONED ABOVE, JORDAN ALREADY HAS A LIMITED SUCH CAPABILITY.
ONLY SLIGHT ADDITIONAL US EFFORTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INCREASE
IT (GREATER AIRLIFT CAPACITY ALREADY PLANNED, INCLUDING 707-320'S
NOTED ABOVE). FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE US ASSISTANCE COULD BE
JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF JORDAN'S OWN IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND WITH
RESPECT TO ITS GROWING ROLE IN OMAN. THE US COULD THUS
AID IN AUGMENTING THIS CAPABILITY AT LITTLE OR NOT ADDTIIONAL
COST. FROM OUR PERSPECITIVE, THE DEGREE OF POLITICAL RISK
REGARDING REACTIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES IS
PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE, BUT HERE WE CENTAINLY DEFER TO JIDDA
AND GULF CAPITALS AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING SUCH JORDANIAN ACTIVITIES WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN
DETERMING SUCH REACTIONS.

10. FINALLY, JORDANIANS ARE SOMEWHAT PUT OFF BY A LACK OF
CLEAR ARTICULTATION OF WHAT ROLE WE SEE THEM PLAYING IN THE
GUL. OUR POLICY TOWARDS THESE EFFORTS IS NOW A STRUCTURE
BUILT ON "AD HOCERY." THEY THINK WE BELIEVE WE KNOW WHERE WE
WOULD LIKE TO GO BUT THAT WE ARE NOT TELLING THEM MEANWHILE WE
TREAT EACH ISSUE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, IN ADDITION, THERE IS
SOMETIMES DEVELOPED HERE A SENSE AMONG JORDANIANS THAT IN RESPECT
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TO ANY SPECIFIC ISSUE IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE GULF, OUR
REACTIONS ARE DETERMINED MORE BY OUR GENERAL UNWILLINGNESS TO SAY
"NO" TO A PROPOSAL OF THEIRS, THAN BY A CLEAR CUT IDEA ABOUT
WHAT WE WOULD LIKE THEM TO DO.

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11. POLICY

IN SUM THE FOLLOWING BASIC LINES OF APPROACH SEEM NOW TO
UNDERGIRD OUR EFFORTS WITH THE JORDANIANS IN THE GULF:
A) WHERE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WANT THEM TO HELP, WE ENCOURAGE
JORDANIAN PARTICUPATION IN DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS IN THE GULF;
B) WHERE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE UNABLE TO PAY FOR JORDANIAN
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HELP AND THE REQUIREMENT IS TOO LARGE FOR JORDAN TO FINANCE
(GENERALLY ALMOST ALL CASES FIT THIS LATTER CATEGORY); JORDAN

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LOOKS TO THE US, BUT IS TOLD TO SEEK THIRD-COUNTRY SUPPORT;
C) WHERE THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT IS NOT FORTHCOMING, THE
PROJECT IS GENERALLY STILLBORN;
D) WHERE THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT IS FORTHCOMING, AND IN OTHER CASES
AS WELL, WE HAVE URGED THE JORDANIANS TO SHAPE THEIR ROLE
SO AS NOT TO DISTURB RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR POWERS IN THE AREA,
PRINCIPALLY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA;
E) WHERE JORDAN HAS DEVELOPED FOR ITSELF A POLICY OF BUILDING
A FIRE BRIGADE CAPABILITY, WE HAVE ACQUIESCED AND THE
JORDANIANS THEREBY PRESUME WE SUPPORT SUCH A FTURE ROLE;
F) FURTHER, THE JORDANIANS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH US APPROVAL
COVERS THE US OF A FIRE GRIGADE AND PERHAPS LARGER FORCES,
IN THE VENT FRIENDLY, TRADITIONAL RULERS IN GULF AND PENINSULA
ARE OVERTURNED BY RADICAL ARABS HOSTILE TO THE US OR JORDAN.
G) WHEN MILITARY EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY OR REPLACEMENT HAS BEEN
AN ISSUE FOR US IN SUPPORT OF JORDANIAN EFFORTS IN THE GULF,
JORDAN HAS RECEIVED AN UNCERTAIN SIGNAL, IN PART BECAUSE A
MORE OR LESS RIGID OBSERVANCE OF BUSINESS AS USUAL PRIORITIES
OF RELEASE AND REPLACEMENT HAVE PREVAILED; ALSO WE HAVE HAD,
OF COURSE, TO LIVE WITHIN A NUMBER OS TRICT LEGALITIES NOT
ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD BY JORDANIANS AS LEGAL RATHER THAN,
AS THE SOMETIMES ASSUME, POLITICAL RESTRAINST.

12. IT IS, IN SUM, A CHECKERBOARD PATTERN OF INVOLVEMENT
WHICH IN MANY WAYS PROVIDES JORDANIANS WITH NOT CLEAR
DIRECTION FOR OUR ROLE WITH THEM IN THE FUTRE. CLARIFICATION
OF OUR OBJECTIVES AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE ARE WILLING TO
ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT JORDANIAN EFFORTS IN THE GULF WOULD BE AN
IMPORTANT
RESULT OF THE CURRENT CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM.
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Message Attributes

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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975AMMAN01060
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750049-0947
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750255/aaaabxim.tel
Line Count: 578
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Reference: 75 STATE 029563
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 NOV 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: WITHDRAWN <26 JUN 2003 by ShawDG, 3.4.X5>; WITHDRAWN <26 JUN 2003 by ShawDG, 3.4.X5>; RELEASED <12 NOV 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <12 NOV 2003 by KelleyW0>
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Review Release Date: n/a
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: ADVISORY ROLES OF THE UK AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES IN DEFENSE/SECURITY FIELD IN PERSIAN GULF STATES
TAGS: PORS, PINS, MASS, XF, UK
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

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